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Abstract 
Mergers have for some years been popular within the public sector in many countries 
this includes mergers between higher education institutions. In the Danish university 
and Government Research Institutions sector a process of merger took place in 2006. 
‘University merger reforms’ is an analysis of this process and not at least the post-
merger processes from the actual merger and up to 2015. Empirically the paper 
focuses on three of the Danish universities: Copenhagen, Aarhus and Aalborg. 
Theoretically the analysis is based on a combination of four models for understanding 
such reforms within the HE-sector and some of the conclusions made from other 
kinds of merger studies. Important conclusions of the study of the three universities 
are that mergers and especially post-mergers processes are much more than linear, 
straight forward rational processes and that understanding merger processes on an 
organizational level demands the use of more than one conceptual model for agenda-
setting - decision making and institutional restructuring,   
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1. Introduction 
The idea of merger reforms has become popular in many policy fields including 
higher education and research. Merger reforms are complex and controversial 
processes as they involve many stakeholders, are dynamic and most often develop 
over long periods of time.  Although there is a growing interest for studying merger 
reforms, there is still scarce knowledge on and understanding of the complexity of 
such reforms. This paper intends to fill some of this research gap. In order to do so we 
analyse a major merger reform launched in 2006
1
in the field of higher education and 
research in Denmark. In order to grasp the complexity we apply a theoretical 
framework based on four perspectives.  
 
The paper investigates the policy process leading to the reform as well as the post-
merger-restructuring processes. The analysis focuses on both university-to-university 
mergers and Governmental Research Institutes (GRI)-to-university mergers. The 
following research questions are addressed: How did the reform develop and how did 
the universities cope with the post-merger restructuring challenges? At the 
organisational level three cases are analysed. The cases are the University of 
Copenhagen, Aarhus University and Aalborg University. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section two presents the theoretical framework 
and method. Section three investigates the policy process analysing the agenda setting 
and decision-making phases including the strategies of the three case universities. 
Section four discusses the short-term reform results by presenting the overall changes 
at the case universities. Section five proceeds by discussing the challenges related to 
the merger configurations at the case universities and analyse the post-merger 
restructuring processes. Section six holds a discussion on how the reform and post-
merger re-structuring processes can be interpreted according to the theoretical 
framework and some conclusions.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and methods 
Analysis of governmental reform processes can be anchored in different conceptual 
models. Four models are archetypes: Reforms may be understood as rational, 
instrumental change processes; as political negotiations processes; as institutional, 
cultural change processes or as ambiguous, incidental processes.  
 
The rational, instrumental model understands reforms as goals-means rational 
decision-making- and implementation processes in which solutions matching 
specified goals are decided on (Scott & Davis, 2007, chapter 2). Goal-means rational 
reforms are expected to be implemented top-down in linear processes at the national 
level as well as at organizational levels.  
 
                                                             
1 This paper constitutes a re-written, slimmed, updated and theoretically re-framed version of 
three book chapters by the same authors in Pinheiro, R.; Geschwind, L. &Aarrevaara, T. (eds.): 
Mergers in Higher Education. The Experience from Northern Europe. Springer, in press. 
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The political, negotiation model understands reforms as arenas where decision-
making and implementation processes are shaped by negotiations in which 
stakeholders pursue their own goals and where negotiations result in compromises 
(Scott & Davis, 2007: 94). At both the national and the organizational level negotiated 
reforms may be expected to be decided on and implemented in mixtures of top-down 
and bottom-up processes as the character of the process depends on the power 
constellations between the actors.  
 
The institutional, cultural model understands reforms as processes where ideas are 
launched and spread and where the implementation of ideas evolve as translation 
processes where actors adapt the reform ideas to local institutional, cultural contexts 
(Røvik, 2007). 
 
Finally, the ambiguous, incidental model understands reforms as arenas where 
streams of problems and streams of solutions are floating around. Entrepreneurial 
actors may be able to couple streams into decision-making and change by succeeding 
in opening “windows of opportunities” (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1976; Kingdon, 
1995). In ambiguous contexts reform processes are emergent and interactions between 
different agendas as well as timing are important aspects. 
 
The analysis will investigate to which extent each of these different models are useful 
interpretations of the 2006 merger reform at the national level as well as of the post-
merger restructuring processes at the three case universities. In the analysis the 
models are supplementing each other as they to different degrees may contribute to 
the understanding of the reform processes as well as to the understanding of different 
aspects of the processes. The idea of using different models is that this enable us 
grasp the complexity of the reform processes. The analytical strategy followed is thus 
a ‘filling-strategy’ (Grøn, Hansen & Kristiansen, 2014; Roness, 1997), sometimes 
also referred to as a complementary strategy.   
 
In the analyses the four models will be combined with distinctions characterizing 
different types of organizational mergers (Harman and Harman 2003; 2008). One 
distinction concerns the compulsiveness of merger reforms. Merger processes may be 
involuntary, initiated from external pressures, or voluntary initiated by the participating 
institutions themselves. Governmental reforms most often are involuntary but they may 
be open for institutional influence and negotiations. Another distinction is the 
characteristics of the new structures developed. These may be unitary where a single 
set of overall structures for governance is introduced or they may be federal where 
specified responsibilities usually remain with the participating institutions. In the 
literature, there is considerable discussion about the strengths and weaknesses of 
different structures.  
 
 4 
By combining the theoretical, conceptual models with the distinctions from the 
merger literature a typology of different understandings of governmental merger 
reforms and the resulting merger structures is developed. Table 1 gives an overview 
of this typology including different understandings of both merger processes and the 
resulting structural configurations.  
 
Table 1: Four perspectives on governmental merger reform processes and resulting 
structures. 
 
Dimensions Rational, 
instrumental 
model   
Political, 
negotiation 
model 
Institutional, 
cultural model 
Ambiguous, 
incidental model 
Merger reform 
processes are 
Involuntary and 
linear top-down 
implemented 
processes.  
Launched as 
involuntary but 
become arenas 
where 
stakeholders 
pursue own 
interests in 
negotiation 
processes.  
Launched as 
involuntary but 
become arenas 
where local actors 
adapt reform 
ideas to local 
cultural contexts.  
Launched as 
involuntary but 
become emergent 
due to 
entrepreneurs able 
to couple streams 
of problems and 
solutions. 
Merger 
structures 
Unitary structures 
are developed to 
gain synergies 
and assure effects 
of economies of 
scale. 
Powerful actors 
are able to refuse 
merger potentials. 
Structures may be 
unitary or federal 
as they are 
compromises 
reflecting the 
interests of the 
most powerful 
actors.  
Federal structures 
are developed as 
actors try to 
protect 
institutional 
identities and 
brands.  
Structures may be 
unitary or federal 
as they emerge in 
unpredictable 
processes. 
 
The four models will be used in the analysis of the agenda setting-  and decision-
making processes, the university strategies as well as the post-merger restructuring 
processes. The analysis is based on the study of documentary material covering the 
period before and after the mergers. In addition, we have interviewed a number of key 
actors involved in the actual merger processes and in the integration and change 
processes from 2007 an onwards. The interviews conducted have been semi-
structured concentrating on two main subjects: The interviews gave the informants the 
opportunity to present their version of the sequence of events in the merger process. 
And the interviews helped us understand specific events documented in the written 
material. All interviews were made in 2014.
i
 
 
3. Agenda setting, decision making and strategies  
Having presented the theoretical framework and methods we now turn to the analysis. 
First the focus is on the agenda setting and the decision-making at the overall national 
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level. Secondly, we turn to the analysis of the organizational processes at the case 
universities.  
 
3.1. Agenda setting 
Discussions about mergers were on the policy agenda for several years before the 
reform was launched. Two different types of mergers were discussed. One type 
concerned inter-university mergers, the other amalgamations between the GRIs and 
the universities. Both topics came on the agenda in 2001 as part of the work of the 
Research Commission established by government. The overall arguments were that 
more comprehensive institutions would be a mean to gain synergy effects in relation 
to both education and research, to enhance the international competitiveness and to 
use resources more efficient. More specific arguments in favour of GRI-to-university 
mergers were that the GRI staff should participate more in teaching activities 
(Research Commission 2001, reviewed in Hansen 2001).  
 
The merger agenda was followed-up by carrying out analyses. The Danish Research 
Council (2002) analysed all GRI’s and concluded that only some of the GRIs should 
be merged into universities. An inter-ministerial working group argued that mergers 
were not necessary as co-operation could be organised in different ways and a survey 
showed that widespread educational collaboration between GRIs and universities was 
already taking place (Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 2003). In spite 
of the critical voices the government decided to merge four GRIs into three 
universities in 2003. Action was thus added to a process hitherto involving only the 
articulation of solutions and (non)problems. Two of the merged GRIs had been under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Science. If a merger policy was to be considered 
credible by other ministries, the Ministry of Science had to lead the way. OECD was 
asked to conduct a study of the Danish university system. One of the 
recommendations was that ‘mono-faculty universities’, defined as universities with 
one or two faculties, should be integrated into multi-faculty universities (OECD 
2004). This gained support by the Danish Council for Research Policy (2006).  
 
Meanwhile the government had published a programme titled “New Goals” outlining 
ambitious targets. Denmark was to be a “leading knowledge society” and have 
“world-class education” (Danish Government 2005). To achieve this, a Globalisation 
Council was established and asked to work out a strategy. The council headed by the 
prime minister discussed issues related to research and education, thus contributing to 
a ripening of the proposed reforms.  
 
Concrete proposals for mergers were also launched during this phase: A committee 
proposed a ‘Food University’ (Committee to Evaluate Options for Improving 
Research at the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University of Copenhagen and the 
Danish Institute of Agricultural Sciences 2005). The proposal was well received by 
institutions to be merged in their entirety, but criticised by those who were to cede 
parts of their organisations. Another group proposed a Danish MIT-like university by 
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merging several universities and GRIs. The two proposals were incompatible and 
made differences of opinion clear. The merger agenda was boosted, but it also became 
obvious that decisions on mergers were conflictual.  
 
Two other incidents were important preconditions for the later launch of the merger 
reform. Firstly, merger reforms were spreading as popular solutions in the public 
sector as a whole. Secondly, a new University Act was passed in 2003 transforming 
the universities to a company like model with a hierarchical management structure, 
boards with a majority of external members and appointed leaders (Hansen 2004). By 
end of 2005, the new boards and all but one vice-chancellor were in place. The new 
decision-making structure contributed to opening a window of opportunity for the 
merger reform. The newly hired managers could hardly duck their responsibilities 
with regard to mergers. At the same time, institutions were tempted to merge by the 
broader political agenda outlined by the Globalisation Council promising additional 
resources to be provided for the universities in the future.  
 
3.2. Decision-making at the system level 
In February 2006, the government launched the merger reform. The minister of 
science aimed for a solution that involved the entire institutional field, defined as the 
12 universities and 13 GRIs. The minister invited all universities to “engage in a 
dialogue with all potential partners in advance of a process towards integration” and 
on the basis of this to draw up expressions of interest (Sander 2006). At the same 
time, the GRIs were asked to draw up expressions of interest for possible integration 
with universities and other GRIs as well.  
 
The expressions of interest were to be submitted two months later. The agenda was 
clear: mergers were involuntary, but it was also an open process. All input from the 
institutions would be evaluated, they were told, before decisions on how to organize 
the rest of the process were made.  
 
The process went through several phases during 2006. The first phase provided the 
ministry with a collection of expressions of interests. The reform idea as such was 
welcomed, but with scepticism. Whereas the GRIs argued that there was no need for 
integration as the two sectors did fundamentally different work, the universities 
argued that large units are bureaucratic and slow, and mergers long drawn and 
expensive. Reading between the lines, the common denominator was that the 
institutions perceived a risk that mergers would lead to a breakdown of academic 
identities. 
 
In the input from the institutions many possible integration combinations were 
identified. But some patterns did emerge. Eight universities and eight GRIs were 
mainly positive towards mergers, while four universities and five GRIs were rather 
sceptical. One response tried to maintain awareness about the proposed food 
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university. Several GRIs identified University of Copenhagen and the Technical 
University (DTU) as the most attractive “dance partners”.  
 
The expressions of interests also showed that the universities were adopting quite 
different strategies. The University of Copenhagen was open to the integration of 
GRIs solely in the health and natural science fields, while both the Roskilde 
University and Aalborg University were open to integration over a broader academic 
spectrum. Finally, the expressions of interest showed that the mono-faculty 
universities were identified as interesting partners. At the same time, two of these – 
the IT-University and Copenhagen Business School - clearly sent the message that 
“they did not want to dance”.  
 
The expressions of interest returned the ball to the minister's court and started the 
second phase. Two-and-a-half months later, the government announced the main 
outlines of a new map for Danish higher education and research. In the intervening 
period, a number of bilateral meetings had been held. The government's solution 
consisted of three enlarged universities, University of Copenhagen, Aarhus University 
and the Technical University, and some smaller additions to Aalborg University and 
the University of Southern Denmark. The proposal tried to balance different interests 
and can be interpreted as a compromise meeting the needs of the majority.  
 
The idea of strengthening the field of life science at University of Copenhagen was 
supported; so was the desire for growth of the Technical University and Aarhus 
University. Roskilde University which no one “wanted to dance with” was allowed to 
continue unchanged. The package was presented as a fait accompli. The role of the 
boards was to continue to work on integration plans.  
 
However, problems remained. In the university sector, the government's objective still 
was that two or three more universities should be merged into the University of 
Copenhagen and one more into Aarhus University. In relation to the GRIs, further 
negotiations remained with four institutes. 15 September 2006 was set as deadline for 
new responses from the institutions. By the time these were submitted, the institutions 
had largely accepted the government’s proposal. However, voices were still arguing 
for the food university and most of those who initially were negative about the merger 
solutions remained so. In addition, this phase was characterised by a growth-
competition dynamic where several universities expressed interest in two of the GRIs 
still in contention. These feelings were not reciprocated.  
 
In October 2006, the government announced the new university landscape. There 
were few changes. The government took what it could get, but did not exert further 
pressure. Two mono-faculty universities retained their independence. The same 
applied to two GRIs which however were forced to change their names. Only one 
problem remained: The University of Education (DPU) which could not accept the 
conditions for a merger with the University of Copenhagen. In February 2007, it was 
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instead announced that the DPU had agreed on a merger with the University of 
Aarhus. The decision-making process was brought to end.  
 
3.3. Case institutions strategies 
Having analysed the overall decision process we now turn to the analysis of the 
strategies of the case universities. These strategies were not in place when the reform 
was launched but were developed along the decision-making process in internal and 
external negotiation processes.  
 
University of Copenhagen 
The University of Copenhagen is the oldest and largest university in Denmark more 
than 530 years old. Before the mergers it was well consolidated. Due to this the 
merger initiative did not pose a direct threat. As a consequence, the university at first 
signalled that its main priority was to continue untouched in order to remain a 
traditional basic research oriented institution. If this wasn’t possible, it suggested 
merging with the Danish University of Pharmaceutical Sciences, the Royal Veterinary 
and Agricultural University and the IT-University, all institutions with a clear fit.  
 
As mentioned the political system wished to merge the University of Copenhagen 
with a number of other institutions. However, neither the university nor the 
institutions were willing to enter such a partnership and, after negotiations, the 
political pressure was rejected and the university opted to merge only with two 
´mono-faculty´ universities, the Danish University of Pharmaceutical Sciences and 
the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University both located in the Copenhagen 
area. The IT-University decided to remain independent, despite its very small size.  
 
The Danish University of Pharmaceutical Sciences and the Royal Veterinary and 
Agricultural University were both interested in merging with either The Danish 
Technical University or the University of Copenhagen - and for a time it was 
uncertain in which direction they would prefer to move. Eventually The University of 
Copenhagen was chosen primarily due to the argument that a city centre location 
would make it easier to recruit students. The formal merger agreement and the merger 
processes were accordingly fairly straightforward, although not fully in accordance 
with the political wishes. However, an acceptable solution was found quite fast.   
 
Seen from the perspective of the university the merger idea was to some degree 
translated into a “business as usual” strategy. However, seen from the perspective of 
the integrated institutions the picture was quite different. For these institutions the 
main issue was how to retain as much independence as possible. For the two 
universities integrated this was solved by given them status as faculties, but this 
solution was not feasible for all institutions. For the Copenhagen Business School and 
the IT-University this led to a rejection of the overall merger plans, while the 
University of Education had to look for other partners willing to offer more attractive 
conditions.  
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Aarhus University 
Before the mergers Aarhus University, established in 1928, could be characterised as 
a fairly strong and well consolidated comprehensive university. However, at least two 
factors made the situation of Aarhus University quite different from the situation of 
that in Copenhagen. First of all the university management saw some of the proposals 
published early on in the process - in particular the food university and the ´MIT-
light´ proposal - as clear threats to the national position of the university. The 
university feared losing important research environments and was afraid of becoming 
marginalised.  
 
Secondly, a new vice chancellor, and former member of the Research Commission, 
had been appointed shortly before the launch of the reform. He expressed a clear 
ambition to make Aarhus University a strong international university able to compete 
with the University of Copenhagen as well as abroad. The vice chancellor saw the 
merger process both as a threat and as a strategic opportunity (Information 2012). As 
a result the university entered the merger process with a strong willingness to attract 
potential merger partners. A broad variety of other universities and GRIs were seen as 
interesting partners – even in situations where they were located geographically far 
from Aarhus and/or where potential synergies were less obvious.  
 
The first part of the process did not pose major problems. It was decided quite early 
that two large GRIs were to be merged into the university, The Danish Institute of 
Agricultural Sciences and The National Environmental Research Institute, as two new 
independent faculties (DMU 2006). The process cannot be described as fully 
voluntary as the management within both GRIs felt strong political pressure to enter 
the merger process. Staying outside was not seen as an option, but who to merge with 
was an open question. Negotiations were started with a number of institutions, but in 
both cases the GRIs saw Aarhus University as the university offering the best 
conditions. In particular the possibility of remaining independent units within the new 
university was a factor in the decisions.   
 
The part of the merger process involving the two mono-faculty universities, the 
Aarhus School of Business and The Danish University of Education, was more 
challenging. At first neither of the institutions were interested in merging with Aarhus 
University. The Aarhus School of Business preferred to remain independent and the 
Danish University of Education wanted to either remain independent or become an 
independent faculty at the University of Copenhagen (DPU 2006). However, as other 
possibilities seemed to be difficult to realise and the political pressure increased, the 
two institutions accepted the idea of merging into Aarhus University and were able to 
negotiate agreements which allowed them to become independent faculties with their 
brands protected.  
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In this case one specific element of the overall national objectives, being able to 
compete at the top end of the market for students, resources and prestige, was heavily 
prioritised, while other objectives such as synergies and economies of scale played 
minor roles in the first phase of the mergers. But also here the picture looked different 
from the perspectives of the other institutions involved. Again, the objective of 
retaining as much independence as possible was given much more attention than the 
overall national objectives.     
 
Aalborg University 
The pre-merger situation for Aalborg University was different from that of the 
universities in both Aarhus and Copenhagen. Aalborg University is the youngest 
comprehensive university in Denmark, established in 1974 to increase the level of 
competence in the region. The university has developed a distinct problem-based 
teaching profile and its main resources are attached to the engineering field. The 
university has had an important role in the development of the North Jutland region 
and at the same time the university has developed extensive international cooperation. 
It has grown from an institution with quite modest numbers of students to more than 
20.000 today.  
 
Throughout the merger process the university management was strongly in favour of 
a policy of globalisation and having several national campuses. The vice-chancellor 
expressed an ambition to build a strong Copenhagen campus with the aim of using the 
capital city as a hub between the university and global firms. An important 
precondition for the expansion, both nationally and internationally, was the idea that 
the region where the main campus is located is too small both for a university with 
strong ambitions to play a global role within selected research areas and to provide 
the university with an increasing number of students.  
 
As a result the merger reform was seen as a strategic opportunity for Aalborg 
University rather than a threat. Aalborg University went into the process with an 
ambition to attract interested merger partners
2
.  In particular, the university signalled 
that it was open to a number of merger possibilities with GRIs. As it turned out, 
however, only one GRI saw Aalborg University as an attractive partner. This GRI, 
The Danish Building Research Institute, worked within one of the university’s 
original research and education areas and clear potential synergies were easy to spot. 
Building is an area where the university has a strong position nationally and this 
position was recognised by the GRI. This led to the board of the GRI identifying 
Aalborg University as its partner of preference, in spite of the geographical distance 
to the GRI, which was located in the Copenhagen area. Seen from the perspective of 
the university, this location only added to the attractiveness of the partnership as it 
could strengthen Aalborg University’s Copenhagen platform.    
 
                                                             
2http://www.nyhedsarkiv.aau.dk/digitalAssets/29/29289_fra-aau-til-videnskabsministeriet.pdf 
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Seen from the GRI, the main aim identified was to increase research cooperation with 
outside partners through the merger. The GRI made contact with all relevant 
universities, but only Aalborg University was able to meet all its wishes, as it had a 
problem-based learning style and was able to get research out into practice. So even 
though some staff had closer relations to their neighbour, the mono-faculty Danish 
Technical University, Aalborg became the choice.  
 
It was promised early on that a large degree of autonomy could be maintained and 
that the institution should stay in Copenhagen, close to the main group of customers 
in the building industry. The result was a merger of limited scope with in-built 
geographical challenges but also clear potential synergies.  
 
Comparing the cases 
Comparing the three cases a pattern appears, with the three case universities 
developing a goals-means strategy acting on the opportunities for improving or 
maintaining their positions in the national and international landscape, while the 
universities and GRI’s which were to be integrated into larger organisations 
developed an institutional, cultural strategy aiming at maintaining their identity by 
limiting the consequences of the implementation of the reform as much as possible.  
 
But the individual universities also differed. This was seen most clearly in the 
differences between the University of Copenhagen and Aarhus University, where the 
former saw no urgent need for increased competitiveness through mergers, while the 
latter saw the process as a clear strategic opportunity and perhaps also as a necessity. 
The same might be seen in the Aalborg case, where the increased activity in the 
Copenhagen area was a specific strategic target. 
 
As a consequence, the way in which the process was carried out turned out to be a 
double-edged sword for the creation of increased international competitiveness and 
increased efficiency. Both the University of Copenhagen and the Aarhus University 
stretched their range of governance to a broader and (especially for Aarhus 
University) a much more diverse organisational structure, and Aalborg University 
increased its activities in the Copenhagen area, far away from its main campus. As a 
consequence, only very limited economies of scale could be achieved in this phase 
due to the lack of real integration. In most cases the administrative expenditure 
probably increased over the first couple of years as a result of the merger processes.  
 
4. Reform results: Short term 
In this section the landscape resulting from the merger reform is presented. All in all 
the merger reform reduced the number of universities from 12 to 8 and led to the 
integration of most of the GRI’s into to the university sector. The objectives for the 
reform was only partly carried out successfully. In relation to the “big is beautiful” 
objective three universities were able to stay out of the process. Another important 
benefit was realized in a number of cases, namely; increased co-operation between 
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university researchers and teachers and former GRI researchers in the realms of both 
research and teaching as to create more international competitiveness and enhance the 
development of new ideas, concepts, processes and patents.   
 
Zooming in on the case universities, table 2 shows their development in size since the 
merger reform. The figures concerns 2014, the figures in brackets show the 
development from the “old” universities 2006 to the “new” universities 2007. 
 
Table2: The development of the case universities: Key figures 
University Revenue in 1.000 
EUR nominal terms 
Number of 
students enrolled 
No. of staff full 
time 
equivalents 
No. of 
institutions 
taken-over  
University of 
Copenhagen 
1.107.442 
(556.335- 809.567) 
40.882  
(33.359-37.796) 
10.058 
(5.530-7.836) 
          2 
Aarhus 
University 
834.165 
(345.655-587.276) 
38.120 
(19.607-29.550) 
8.028 
(3.851-6.216) 
          4 (hereby 2 
GRI’s) 
Aalborg 
University 
361.536 
(189.192-205.790) 
20.411 
(10.877-10.972) 
3.325 
(2.152-2.204) 
          1 GRI 
Sources: Statistics available from Universities Denmark: 
http://www.dkuni.dk/Statistik/Universiteternes-statistiske-beredskab (only in Danish). 
 
The table shows the significant increase in revenue, students and staff at Aarhus 
University from 2006 to 2007 clearly reflecting the growth strategy of the university. 
It also shows the increase in especially revenue and staff at University of Copenhagen 
from 2006 to 2007 reflecting that the institutions taken-over in Copenhagen were less 
teaching intensive than some of the institutions taken-over in Aarhus. At Aalborg 
University the immediate changes were more limited whereas there has been a 
considerable growth in the years after the merger reform.  
 
5. Post-merger re-structuring 
This section looks deeper into the post-merger activities of the three case universities. 
But before this is done the merger configurations and the challenges expected from 
these are discussed.  
 
5.1. Merger configurations at the case universities 
Besides the distinctions mentioned in section two the merger literature offer other 
dimensions for describing mergers. As shown in table 3 mergers may be two- or 
multi-partner; single sector involving institutions from only one higher education 
sector or cross-sectorial involving institutions from different sectors; and they may 
involve similar or different academic profiles. Finally distance/geography is also of 
importance. It is argued that the more mergers involve multiple partners, are cross-
sectorial, include different academic profiles as well as geographic distance, the larger 
the post-merger challenges will be (Harman & Robertson-Cuninghame 1995, 
Norgaard and Skodvin 2002). On these dimensions the mergers at the three 
universities differed substantially.  
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Table 3: Comparing merger configurations 
Merger types: 
University: 
Number of 
partners 
Single-/cross-
sector 
Similar/different 
academic 
profiles 
Distance/geography 
University of 
Copenhagen 
          3 Single-sector Rather similar, 
complimentary 
Short distance 
Aarhus 
University 
          5 Both single- and 
cross-sector 
Both rather 
similar, 
complimentary 
and dissimilar 
partners 
Widespread 
throughout the 
country 
Aalborg 
University 
          2 Cross-sector Rather similar, 
complimentary 
Long distance but 
only two locations 
 
 
The University of Copenhagen was a single-sector merger with three rather similar, 
complimentary partners located within a short distance. The merger meant that the 
number of faculties increased from 6 to 8. The Aarhus University merger had both 
single-sector (university-university) and cross-sector (university-GRI) elements. 
There were several partners some with rather similar and complementary profiles, but 
others with dissimilar academic profiles and most of the partners were furthermore 
located quite far from each other. The university experienced an increase in the 
number of faculties from 5 to 9. At Aalborg University the merger was a cross-sector 
merger characterised by long distance. There were only two partners and the GRI 
involved was fairly small compared to the university.  
 
5.2. Post-merger re-structuring 
The merger configurations outlined above have implications for how challenging 
post-merger restructuring aiming at developing unitary structures is expected to be. At 
one end of a continuum an eventual aim of developing a unitary structure at Aarhus 
University would be expected to be a considerable managerial challenge. At the other 
end an eventual aim of this at University of Copenhagen would be expected to be a 
more limited managerial challenge while the challenge at Aalborg University would 
be expected to be in-between. The following investigates what happened.   
 
University of Copenhagen 
At the time of the merger, University of Copenhagen chose to organize the incoming 
universities in a federal structure. Although a fairly manageable post-merger process 
could be expected a number of factors indicated challenges. The merger process had 
been a fast and closed top down process with limited involvement of staff and the 
long-term plans were unclear.  
 
From a management perspective it was soon seen as a problem that only limited 
synergies were created. Increased collaboration across the faculties was seen as a 
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solution to gain synergy. The idea was to initiate a one-by-one analysis of disciplines 
present at several faculties, starting with the field of chemistry. In 2011 an 
international committee published a report on chemistry suggesting that the existing 
four chemistry departments located at three faculties should merge into one 
department located at the faculty of natural science. This proposal was controversial. 
Especially FARMA, the former Danish University of Pharmaceutical Sciences, 
argued that if it was implemented it would drain their research environment (Zieler 
2011). Also LIFE, the former Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, was 
sceptical.  
 
Realizing that the one-discipline-at-a-time strategy was not feasible, other strategies 
were discussed. One issue was an increasing awareness about a possible future threat 
from Aarhus University, if they should decide to develop the field of natural science 
at their campus in Copenhagen. It was proposed to merge FARMA and the 
veterinarian part of LIFE into the medical faculty and the agricultural part of LIFE 
into the faculty for natural sciences. In addition to these post-merger restructuring 
ideas, it was proposed to reduce the number of departments considerable. The so-
called “dry” faculties (social science, humanities, law and theology) would not be 
affected. 
 
The board asked the vice-chancellor to work out a concrete and motivated proposal in 
a process involving staff. This resulted in a slightly revised proposal. The idea of 
faculty mergers was unchanged, but the plan for a new department structure revised. 
Some departments wished to keep their identity and a few of them succeeded. The 
proposal passed the board with one vote. The new structure took effect from January 
2012.  
 
As a result the former Pharmaceutical University, for a while three departments at 
FARMA, is now two departments at Health. The academic identity is more or less 
maintained, and there is still a strong brand vis-à-vis the medical industry. The former 
Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, for a while the LIFE faculty, has been 
split up. The veterinarian part is localized in Health, while the agricultural part has 
been integrated within SCIENCE. In general, scientific staff is mostly localized in the 
laboratories and offices at the same campus environments as before, but the 
administrative staff has been heavily reorganized in a process challenged by large 
cultural differences across the former independent institutions.    
 
Above it was expected that the post-merger process should be fairly manageable as 
there were clear potential synergies and as the three institutions had nearby locations. 
As the analysis has shown this expectation was not met. The first step in the post-
merger process, the one-discipline-at-a-time-strategy, was not a success. The second 
step, the merger of FARMA and LIFE into the medical and natural science faculties 
was a process showing a number of conflicts and highlighting large cultural 
differences at the former independent institutions. In particular, we observe that 
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changes of the overall structures are manageable, but as soon as we touch the 
departmental levels conflicts arise.    
 
Aarhus University 
At Aarhus University the picture was even more complex and challenging. Due to the 
merger configuration a highly challenging post-merger re-structuring process could be 
expected. Some of the institutions taken-over had been quite reluctant and the process 
had been top down driven with low staff involvement. In addition, the differences 
between the involved institutions with different sector backgrounds, different 
missions and different cultures posed further challenges. And finally, also the 
geographical distance between the institutions, the limited time for analysis and 
planning and the unclear long-term goals of the merger would be expected to add to 
the challenges of the post-merger process.  
 
A central precondition for the Aarhus University merger was as mentioned that in 
order to attract partners the university had offered large degrees of autonomy to the 
new units. This meant that they were merged into the university as independent 
faculties in a federal structure. Besides being a precondition for the merger decision, 
this structure soon was seen by management as a barrier for attempts to create real 
integration. The central university management identified a number of challenges 
including: an increased demand for efficiency, an increased demand for concrete 
synergy effects, a need to break down ”silos” to increase collaboration, and a need to 
create greater scope for strategic leadership. But even though the situation called for 
further restructuring this could not be initiated due to the nature of the agreements. No 
major changes were thus implemented during the first couple of years.  
 
That further changes could be expected was indicated in 2008 when the university 
adopted the Aarhus University Strategy 2008-2012. This strategy underlined the need 
for an academic reorganization. Following this strategy the vice-chancellor initiated 
the so-called academic development process and in June 2010 the board decided to 
organize research and teaching activities in four new main academic areas. In March 
2011, the board took a final decision after a period of negotiations (Pinheiro & 
Stensaker 2014).  
 
At this point the number of faculties was reduced to four: Arts; Science and 
Technology; Health; and Business and Social Sciences. Where there used to be fifty-
five departments, there were now twenty-six. At the management level the 
restructuring led to a change from ten management units to a unified senior leadership 
team with cross cutting responsibility for strategic management and quality assurance. 
The former independent GRIs were in many cases split up and integrated within other 
departments or units. 
 
More or less all initiatives were initiated and implemented by the central institutional 
leadership with limited input from staff. Not surprisingly this process has been 
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controversial. Internally as well as externally strong critique has been voiced and the 
discontent has also been documented in a number of reports.  The first documentation 
of some of the problems came in 2012 when Aarhus University conducted a large-
scale study of the psychosocial work environment. Based on an analysis of more than 
6,000 completed questionnaires the study provided documentation of high levels of 
stress, uncertainty, frustration and a very low trust in the central leadership (Aarhus 
University 2012).  
 
The next piece of evidence of the problems came in a report focusing at the 
integration of the former GRIs. Based on a large survey it was examined how the 
former GRI staff had experienced the merger process and how it had affected their 
working conditions (Bloch; Pedersen & Aagaard 2012). The report drew a remarkably 
negative image. The survey uncovered a widespread scepticism towards the rationales 
of the mergers. Many respondents pointed out that the level of information and the 
degree of involvement had been scarce due to the speed of the process. Secondly, a 
large majority of the respondents also indicated that the conditions for carrying out 
consultancy and applied research had been impaired as a result of the mergers. In 
relation to these issues the survey also pointed towards difficulties associated with a 
shift in identity and culture.  
 
Finally, also an analysis from a so-called internal expert group within Aarhus 
University established by the central management documents widespread problems 
(The Expert Group 2014). The report argues that there has been a too extensive 
centralization, and too great emphasis has been placed on standardization and the 
presentation of the university as a unified whole. The survey carried out by the expert 
group shows widespread scepticism from the employees with regard to university 
strategy and the initiatives derived from it.  
 
According to the analysis, the change process is perceived as the management’s 
project, and the university’s employees feel very little ownership over it. As a 
consequence it is argued that it has been difficult to derive the benefit from the 
diversity and that insufficient space has been allowed for the development of 
professional and academic differences. The report shows that the change process has 
underestimated the significance of professional identity and inner motivation for both 
academic and technical/administrative staff members. A large proportion of the 
academic staff members at the departments do not regard the current structure as 
appropriate.  
 
Increasingly, the central university management has acknowledged these problems. In 
particular after a new vice-chancellor took office in August 2013 the management has 
shown willingness to address the challenges, and most recently this has led to a 
decision based on the problem analysis to roll back some of the most radical elements 
of the 2011 reorganization (The Senior Management Team 2014). These decisions are 
in particular targeting the issues of centralization and standardization and aim to 
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decentralize the administration to create more room for diversity, a greater proximity 
to users and more flexibility in relation to the local needs of the academic 
organization. In addition, the management team has decided that a review of the 
structure of the departments at all faculties must be carried out in order to ensure that 
the organization of the departments provides appropriate support for the academic 
disciplines and for cooperation.  
 
In relation to this it is specifically mentioned that special attention shall be paid to the 
needs of the former University of Education and the former Aarhus Business School 
in order to secure more room for independent visibility and branding. The needs of 
the former GRIs are not mentioned in relation to potential restructuring at the 
departmental level.  
 
The decisions put forward do, however, not affect the university’s overall structure 
consisting of four faculties and a unified administration, as the senior management 
team holds that this organization ensures the university’s resilience in the face of 
increasing external demands.  
 
Aalborg University 
Finally, the case of Aalborg University was characterized by a much smaller merger 
with only one GRI (the Danish Building Research Institute) where most factors 
pointed in the direction of a manageable post-merger process with the geographical 
distance between the partners as the most challenging aspect. The GRI located in the 
metropolitan area had at the time of the merger a staff of approximately 100 which 
was 5 % of the entire staff at the university.  
 
As mentioned the reason for the mutual interest in the merger was first and foremost 
that the competencies of the two institutions were seen as complementary with the 
potential of achieving an advantage by combining their individual efforts within the 
areas of research in building activities. This mutual interest was present from the 
beginning and has been maintained through the entire process. The two partners 
already before the merger cooperated on several research activities. The ideas behind 
an increased integration were both to create a strong international research profile, to 
be in front in Denmark on building research, and to increase the education activities 
with both partners involved.  
 
This led to one of the first decisions: That the GRI staff should remain in the 
metropolitan area. This was backed up through calculations showing that to move the 
staff to Aalborg would be expensive. Coupled to that were plans of the university to 
increase its activities in the Copenhagen area. This should be done through offering 
educations not previously offered in that area. In addition to this the university also 
wanted an increased presence in the metropolitan area in research. 
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All in all, the merger process went rather smooth with large autonomy and close 
cooperation between the two partners. This can also be seen when the results of the 
workplace environment assessment of 2009 and 2012 are studied. The former staff of 
the GRI reports the following: Satisfied or strongly satisfied with the working 
conditions: 80% in 2009 and 73% in 2012, and satisfied with the expectations for the 
future: 47% in 2009 and 45% in 2012. The uncertainty with regard to the future and 
the general decrease might be a result of the long-drawn process of finding a new 
location. The rather low result on expectations for the future might be coupled with a 
very low percentage of satisfaction among the administrative staff.  
 
The process since the merger involved a large number of changes in rules and 
regulations. Although some of the formal structures are different, the main goal has 
been to create the same conditions for all staff at the university. At the same time the 
culture of the former GRI has changed and parts of these changes have been difficult 
for some. GRI staff still has their team-management and other special features, but 
converge gradually toward the university structures and processes. New educational 
programmes have been developed and are run by the staff, and more than the planned 
10% of the income is today coming from teaching activities. Research co-operation 
with the rest of the university has increased.  
 
Comparing the cases 
The analyses have shown that the post-merger re-structuring processes at the three 
case universities developed differently. The complexity of merger configurations 
influenced post-merger re-structuring challenges but other factors such as how radical 
the post-merger reforms were and the degree to which staff became involved also 
contributed to explain how the processes developed.  
 
As expected the post-merger re-structuring was most challenging at Aarhus 
University where the post-merger reform also was most radical. But also the 
University of Copenhagen experienced significant difficulties as attempts were made 
to move from the initial federal structure towards a more unitary structure and as the 
reforms started to target the department level. At Aalborg University the post-merger 
process has in most respects been unproblematic but here the federal structure has 
been maintained and most parts of the ”old” Aalborg University have only been 
marginally affected.  
 
6. Theoretical discussion and conclusion   
On the basis of the analysis it is discussed below how the reform process and the post-
merger re-structuring processes can be interpreted according to the four theoretical 
perspectives. Table 4 sums up the contributions of the four models to the 
interpretation of the overall reform process.  
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Table 4: Comparison of the agenda setting and decision-making phases based on four 
theoretical perspectives 
Phase: 
Perspective: 
   Agenda setting Decision-making including 
university strategies 
Rational, instrumental model Limited contribution to 
understanding. Though attempts 
to include goal-means based 
analytical reflections in the 
process.   
Contributes to understanding 
actor strategies based in goals 
concerned with growth and 
strengthening of positions. 
Political, negotiation model Contributes to understanding 
the overall process including 
the conflicts made visible in the 
process. 
Contributes to understanding 
how the open space in an 
involuntary reform was used by 
stakeholders to gain influence. 
Institutional, cultural model Limited contribution. Though 
some contribution to the 
understanding of the length of 
this phase – a Danish 
administrative culture for 
dialogue. 
Contributes to understanding 
actor strategies for maintaining 
identities and brands.  
Ambiguous, incidental model Contributes to understanding 
the emergent character of the 
process and the entrepreneurial 
innovative solutions proposed. 
Contributes to understanding 
the overall emergent character 
of the process. 
 
Overall the agenda setting phase was emergent rather than linear and it was a process 
characterized by ambiguity. The ambiguity was targeted by carrying out reviews and 
analysis in an attempt to transform the process to a goals-means rational process. 
However, the analytical activities became platforms for stakeholders pursuing their 
own goals more than overall goals-means rational analyses of problems and solutions. 
This turned the agenda setting phase into a negotiation process. Overall, the political, 
negotiation model is thus the theoretical model contributing the most to understanding 
this phase. To some extent the ambiguous, incidental model also contributes to 
understanding the phase of agenda-setting as there were entrepreneurial actors able to 
couple streams of solutions and problems into innovative merger proposals. However 
these were not realized but contained by institutional resistance. The political, 
negation model so to speak encircled the ambiguous, incidental model.   
 
Also the decision making process was emergent rather than linear and characterized 
by ambiguity as well. The ambiguity was profound although reduced along the 
emergent process. The merger reform was involuntary but at the same time the 
process gave considerable room for the institutions to decide on whom to merge with 
turning the process into a negotiation process. Also in this phase the political negation 
model is the theoretical model contributing the most to understanding the reform 
process as it became an arena for stakeholders pursuing their own interests. Time was 
a scarce good limiting the possibilities for carrying out goal-means rational analyses. 
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Maybe the speed in the decision-making process also was a governmental strategy to 
limit resistance. Both the rational, instrumental and the institutional, cultural model 
contribute to our understanding of how institutions defined their interests. In the 
rational, instrumental perspective institutional strategies were means to fulfil goals 
concerned with improving positions through growth. In the institutional, cultural 
perspective they were means to maintain identity and brands. For some institutions, 
the process led to the maintenance of the status quo, but for most it resulted in 
significant mergers, typified by federal structures. None of the existing institutions 
were physically relocated or broken up in the first place, but embedded in their 
existing form.  
 
Finally, the post-merger re-structuring processes were characterized by considerable 
ambiguity, although less at Aalborg University than at Aarhus University and the 
University of Copenhagen. Whereas the rational, instrumental model contributes to 
understanding how the management of the universities worked out formal strategies 
and acted in the post-merger processes in attempts to harvest synergy, the 
institutional, cultural model contributes to understand the resistance experienced 
towards strategies turning federal structures into unitary. Whereas the rational, 
instrumental and the institutional, cultural models contribute to understanding the 
positions, arguments and actions of the different actors, the political, negotiation and 
the ambiguous, incidental models contribute to the understanding of the post-merger 
processes overall. As especially the case of Aarhus University but also the case of 
University of Copenhagen show post-merger re-structuring processes are emergent 
and not linear due to both negotiations between stakeholders and unpredictable 
incidents.  
 
In the introduction two research questions were posed. We now return to these and 
sum up the answers. The first question concerned how the overall reform developed. 
Both the agenda setting phase and the decision-making phase were characterized by 
ambiguity. The agenda setting phase was ongoing for several years. Both inter-
university and GRI-to-university mergers were discussed and analysed. The process 
resulted in exposure of conflicts rather than agreement on solutions. The decision-
making phase, on the contrary, was rather short. The merger reform was initiated by  
government in an involuntary top-down manner, but also with possibilities for (some) 
institutions to influence solutions.  
 
In relation to the four theoretical conceptual models discussed in section two, the 
rational, instrumental model to some extent contribute to the interpretation of the 
agenda setting phase, but rationality was all along encircled by negotiation. In the 
decision-making phase the political negotiation model seems very important in order 
to understand the overall process. However in order to understand the positions of the 
institutions both the rational, instrumental and the institutional, cultural model are 
important. Whereas the case universities taking-over institutions developed goal-
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means rational strategies the institutions expecting a take-over sought solutions 
expected to retain their institutional identity. 
  
Finally, the second research question concerned how universities coped with post-
merger re-structuring challenges. This part of the analysis showed that post-mergers 
challenges were different across the case universities partly due to differences in 
merger configurations. In Aarhus where the post-merger reforms towards developing 
a unitary structure were most radical the challenges were profound. But also in 
Copenhagen difficulties arose as soon as reform processes reached the department 
level. In Aalborg post-merger restructuring was marginal as the federal structure was 
maintained. Within the institutions the rational, instrumental model contributes to our 
understanding of how the university managements developed post-merger reform 
strategies whereas the institutional, cultural model contribute to explain how 
resistance towards these developed.  
 
Looking at the process overall at the national level it is clear that the reform process 
in no way was a linear process with predictable results.  Rather it was an emergent 
process where streams of solutions and streams of problems steadily floated around, 
were re-framed and in some points of time became coupled in decisions on concrete 
mergers. Both institutions and the government played a role in the coupling of 
streams. Applying a theoretical framework based on four perspectives has accordingly 
enabled us to better understand the complexity of merger reform and re-structuring 
processes which are dynamic, in flux and characterized by ambiguous and ambitious 
aims. 
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iIn the Aalborg case three of the main managerial and administrative actors deeply involved in the 
merger-process were interviewed, two face-to-face and one by telephone and notes were taken. In the 
Aarhus case three of the top managers from the integrated institutions were interviewed, one face-to-
face and two by telephone, and notes were taken. In the Copenhagen case one interview was conducted 
face-to-face. In addition board meetings with discussions on post-merger restructuring processes were 
attended. 
